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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING-DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNCILMAN 
FOR PERSONAL INTEREST-An amendatory zoning ordinance was enacted1 by 
the city council of Miami Beach for the purpose of changing the zoning 
of an extensive area fronting on the Atlantic Ocean from a private 
residential to a hotel district. The amendment received the required 
affirmative votes of five of the seven members of the council, including 
the vote of one councilman who owned land in the area affected by the 
amendment which would be increased in value by $500,000 because of 
the zoning change. Plaintiffs, owners of near-by property, filed suit in 
the circuit court to have the amendatory ordinance declared invalid and 
to enjoin its enforcement. The chancellor granted the injunction.2 On 
appeal, held, reversed. The enactment by a city council of an amendatory 
zoning ordinance is a legislative function and cannot be invalidated on 
the ground that a councilman whose vote was essential to the passage 
of the ordinance had a substantial financial interest in land affected by 
the zoning change. City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, (Fla. App. 1958) 104 
S. (2d) 129. 
Courts3 and secondary authorities4 subscribe to the general rule that 
when a municipal council exercises legislative power delegated to it by 
the state, the courts will not consider the motives or self-interest5 of the 
members in passing upon the validity of the action. A government body 
acts in a legislative capacity when it prescribes a general course of conduct 
applicable to persons or property within its jurisdiction.6 Action in a 
quasi-judicial capacity occurs when the body grants or denies a privilege 
based upon a finding of fact that circumstances exist which require the 
application of a general rule.7 Viewed as a difference in the degree of 
1 Under authority of Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §176.02. For a discussion of the Florida 
enabling act, see BENTLEY AND BAYER, MUNICIPAL ZONING: FLORIDA LAW AND PRACTICE 
(1950). 
2 The chancellor ruled that the councilman's interest compelled the court to assign 
a fraudulent motive to him. On appeal the evidence was held to not indicate any fraud-
ulent action on his part. Principal case at 131. 
3 Soon Hing v. Crowley, II3 U.S. 703 (1885); Blankenship v. Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 
49 S.E. (2d) 321 (1948); Moore v. Village of Ashton, 36 Idaho 485, 2ll P. 1082 (1922); 
People v. Gardner, 143 Mich. 104, 106 N.W. 541 (1906). 
4 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §4.10 (1955); 5 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §16.90 (1949). 
5 Statements will be found to the effect that a public officer will be disqualified from 
voting on any matter in which he -has a direct pecuniary interest, but these are usually 
dicta, for the cases were concerned with quasi-judicial or administrative action. See, e.g., 
Genkinger v. New Castle, 368 Pa. 547, 84 A. (2d) 303 (1951) (councilmen voted themselves 
pensions). See generally Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. I, 60 A. (2d) 774 (1948), and 
133 A.L.R. 1258 (1941). 
6 Story v. Macon, 205 Ga. 590, 54 S.E. (2d) 396 (1949) (ordinance providing for street 
paving); Blankenship v. Richmond, note 3 supra, at 104: "An ordinance that regulates 
or restricts the use of property regulates or restricts conduct with respect to that property 
and is purely legislative." 
7 West Jersey Traction Co. v. Board of Public Works of the City of Camden, 56 
424 MICHIGAN LAw REvrnw [Vol. 57 
allowable discretion, a quasi-judicial body exercises a discretion which 
operates only within an area defined by the grant of the legislative body 
and is governed by the standards which the latter imposes.8 The recent 
case of Aldom v. Borough of Roseland9 held an amendment to a zoning 
ordinance to be a quasi-judicial act because of the deliberative function 
involved in the council's taking testimony and weighing conflicting 
public considerations in reaching its decision to amend. However, the 
nature of the legislative function should not be altered because evidence 
is received upon which a decision to legislate is predicated.10 The reasoning 
of the Aldom case seems to confuse an amendatory zoning ordinance with 
the granting of a variance.11 A variance qualifies as a quasi-judicial act12 
as it is granted by a board13 exercising discretion to vary the application14 
of a zoning ordinance to specific property without affecting other property,15 
and permits only the particular use for which it is requested.16 An amend-
ment to a zoning ordinance alters the district's size and shape and reclassi-
fies the use permitted of all property in the area affected.17 The principal 
N.J.L. 431, 29 A. 163 (1894), affd. sub nom. Camden Horse rRailroad Co. v. West Jersey 
Traction Co., 57 N.J.L. 710, 34 A. 1134 (1895). 
s Sieg! v. Zoning Board of North Kingston, 75 R.I. 502, 67 A. (2d) 369 (1949) (reclassi-
fication from one established zone to another of lower rating held to be an act of legisla-
tive discretion, not quasi-judicial); Matter of Larkin Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 
N.E. 637 (1926). 
9 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A. (2d) 190 (1956). Cf. Pyatt v. Mayor and Council of 
Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 89 A. (2d) I (1952). 
lOFrank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 285, affd. 272 App. Div. 941, 72 
N.Y.S. (2d) 75 (1947). Cf. 4 McQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., §13.05 (1949). 
11 See also Aliainello v. Town Council of East Providence, 83 R.I. 395, 117 A. (2d) 233 
(1955). . 
12 l METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING, 2d ed., 675 (1955): 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.230 (1957): Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 
A. (2d) 667 (1952). 
13 Variances ,have also been granted by ordinances enacted by the council upon 
recommendation of the board of adjustment. See Downey v. Grimshaw, 410 Ill. 21, IOI 
N.E. (2d) 275 (1951). 
14 The granting of a variance is based on the hardship which results from strict 
application of the wning ordinance to particular property. Oklahoma City v. Harris, 191 
Okla. 125, 126 P. (2d) 988 (1941); Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E. (2d) 
851 (1939). 
15 People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, 389 Ill. 394, 59 N.E. (2d) 671 (1945). A board of adjust-
ment cannot under the guise of a variance effect an amendment to a zoning ordinance. 
Allan v. Zoning Board of Warwick, 79 R.I. 413, 89 A. (2d) 364 (1952): Walton v. Tracy 
Loan and Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P. (2d) 724 (1939) (gas station in residential area 
improper). The board of adjustment is precluded from altering the boundaries of the 
use districts delimited by the ordinance. Kindergan v. Board of Adjustment of River Edge, 
137 N.J.L. 296, 59 A. (2d) 857 (1948). But see McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 
Conn. 433, 101 A. (2d) 284 (1953). See generally 168 A.L.R. 51 (1947). 
16 But the variance must be in harmony with the general purpose and in the spirit 
of the zoning regulations. Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E. (2d) 128-
(1946). 
17 People ex rel. Miller v. Gill, note 15 supra. 
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case, despite the rationale of Aldom case, appears correct in its classification 
of the amendatory zoning ordinance as a legislative action.18 
It cah be argued, however, that courts should not attempt to distinguish 
between legislative and quasi-judicial functions of the municipal council 
when considering the effect of an interested councilman's vote in zoning 
action, and should disqualify self-interested voting in either case. Initially 
there is the difficulty inherent in classifying the nature of the power 
exercised by the governmental body. Secondly, the typical municipal 
council is composed of relatively few members whose personal interests 
are more easily discovered than might be the self-interests of members of 
a larger state or federal legislative body.19 Thirdly, like municipal con-
tracts,20 zoning seems to be particularly susceptible to self-interested action 
by councilmen, and its important effect on· the free use and enjoyment of 
property justifies closer scrutiny by the courts.21 It may be contended that 
the election process provides a sufficient check on a councilman's self-
interested .action.22 But the interested councilman could realize the bene-
fits of his action before a subsequently elected council would be able to 
enact corrective measures, and such corrective measures might not be 
effective against property owners who had relied on the prior action.23 The 
argument often made, that judicial review of a councilman's motives in 
legislative action would interfere with a co-ordinate branch of the govem-
ment,24 seems to call for only a statement of the conclusion of the court 
that it will not review the council's action in this case, since courts 
occasionally do review actions of other government branches. In addition, 
while this argument should also apply when the council acts in a quasi-
judicial capacity, courts have not hesitated to apply a rule of disqualifi-
cation for self-interest in these cases.25 Although the courts have generally 
refrained from stating that the rule of non-review of motives in legislative 
18 Blankenship v. Richmond, note 3 supra. 
19 The diverse and perhaps unascertainaole interests of the members of any legislative 
body of substantial size would seem to render impractical a judicial invalidation of the 
legislative action on grounds of self-interested voting. 
20 See IO McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §29.97 (1949). 
21 Two situations where an exception to a rule of disqualification may be appropriate 
are (1) where so many councilmen are interested that the council could not act [See 
Gardiner v. City of Bluffton, 173 Ind. 454, 89 N.E. 853 (1909)), and (2) where the vote of 
the interested councilman is in accord with the mandate of his constituents. A possible 
solution to the first situation is the use of a referendum [See 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.246 (1957).J. The difficulty of proving the existence of a mandate 
from constituents may well dictate that courts ignore the second exception. 
22 E.g., Moore v. Village of Ashton, note 3 supra. 
23 A subsequent zoning ordinance cannot deprive an owner of a right, acquired under 
a prior ordinance, to use his property in a certain manner, unless the use constitutes a 
nuisance. 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.181 (1957). But see Matter 
of Harbison v. Buffalo, 4 N.Y. (2d) 553, 152 N.E. (2d) 42 (1958). 
24 E.g., Moore v. Village of Ashton, note 3 supra. 
25 See 32 AL.R. 1519 (1924); 133 AL.R. 1258 (1941). 
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action should be abandoned,26 such a result has in effect been reached 
by various techniques which include invalidating legislative action where 
"fraud"27 is involved, or classifying an action as quasi-judicial when in 
other circumstances it has been treated as legislative.28 Conceding that 
the difficulty of inquiring into the motives of municipal legislators may lead 
courts to follow the general rule of non-review, it would appear that in 
zoning actions policy arguments urge that the general rule not be applied, 
and that action involving self-interested votes be invalidated. 
Joel N. Simon 
26 But see Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 75, 125 A. (2d) 890 (1956), 
where the court in dictum indicated that the "long maintained" distinction between 
legislative and quasi-judicial functions of municipal councils in matters of disqualifying 
interests was not applicable. 
27 Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 96 S.W. 201 (1906). Cf. 5 McQUII.LIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §16.91 (1949). Dictum in Zell v. Borough of Roseland, note 26 supra, 
suggests that though an interested councilman may in fact be free from improper motives 
this will be immaterial if he has what in law amounts to an interest in the matter, sug-
gesting that mere self-interest will be sufficient to disqualify a vote as a type of "con-
structive fraud." 
28 See Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, note 9 supra. Enactment of an ordinance 
providing for vacation of a street is one example. Pyatt v. Mayor aqd Council of Dunellen, 
note 9 supra, classified this type of action to be quasi-judicial, whereas Murphy v. Chicago, 
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 247 Ill. 614, 93 N.E. 381 (1910), considered it to be legislative. 
